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This paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy
decisions are determined by legislative bargaining. The policy space incorporates both productive
and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation. The productive spending is investing in
a public good that benefits all citizens (e.g., national defense or air quality) and the distributive
spending is district-specific transfers (e.g., pork barrel spending). Investment in the public good
creates a dynamic linkage across policy-making periods. The analysis explores the dynamics of
legislative policy choices, focusing on the efficiency of the steady state level of taxation and
allocation of tax revenues. The model sheds new light on the efficiency of legislative policy-making












It has long been argued that legislatures in which representatives are elected by geographically
deﬁned districts will make ineﬃcient decisions. According to conventional wisdom, legislators will
try to beneﬁt their constituents at the expense of the general community through pork barrel
spending and other distributive policies (e.g., cotton or tobacco subsidies). This leads to both
excessive spending and a misallocation of government revenues between distributive policies and
important national public goods.
Despite this widely held view, formal political theory tells us little about the dynamics of
legislative policy choices. Will legislative policy-making result in a long run size of government
that is too large? What will be the time path of investment in national public goods and the
long run levels of these goods? What features of the environment determine the magnitude of
the distortions arising from legislative policy-making? This paper analyzes these questions in a
novel inﬁnite horizon model of legislative policy-making. The model is of an economy in which
policy choices are made by a legislature comprised of representatives elected by single-member,
geographically deﬁned districts. In each period, the legislature chooses the level of a distortionary
income tax and decides how to allocate tax revenues between investment in a public good that
beneﬁts all citizens (national defense or air quality) and district-speciﬁc unproductive transfers
(pork barrel spending). Thus the model incorporates both productive and distributive public
spending and distortionary taxation. The dynamic linkage across periods is created by the public
good which is the state variable. Legislative policy-making in each period is modelled using the
legislative bargaining approach of Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
The results of the model provide a rigorous formal underpinning for the conventional wisdom
described above by showing conditions under which the steady state size of government (as mea-
sured by the tax rate) is too large and the level of public goods is too low. However, we also
show that this conventional view needs qualiﬁcation. When the economy’s taxable capacity is
small relative to its public good needs, legislative decisions will actually be eﬃcient in the long
run, despite the fact that legislators can beneﬁt their districts via distributive policies. Moreover,
t h en a t u r eo ft h ei n e ﬃciency emerging from legislative choice could be quite diﬀerent from that
which the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, legislators could hold back on public good
spending recognizing that creating too large a stock of these goods could lead future legislators to
1start engaging in pork barrel spending. This means that the overall size of government could be
below optimal and revenues could be allocated to their most productive uses - namely, maintaining
public good levels.
The model also generates a number of novel positive implications. First, it suggests that the
size of the legislative coalitions passing budgets may decline over time as a country builds up its
stock of public goods. Second, the model suggests that societies in which citizens have a more
elastic labor supply will enjoy better quality government. A higher elasticity of labor supply,
reduces pork barrel spending but not the long run levels of public goods. Finally, the model
suggests that the quality of government as measured by the proportion of revenues devoted to
distributive policies is inversely correlated with the productivity of the private sector. The model
yields these clean comparative statics results because we fully characterize the set of equilibria
and, in particular, the conditions for a unique equilibrium.
In studying the eﬃciency of politically determined policy choices, our paper contributes to the
literature on the theory of political failure.1 A number of works have explored the eﬃciency of
legislative decision-making from a static perspective. In a well-known paper, Weingast, Shepsle and
Johnsen (1981) argue that distributive policy-making will lead to excessive government spending.
However, they do not model the process of passing legislation, assuming instead that legislative
policy-making is governed by a “norm of universalism”.2 In a legislative bargaining model in
which proposals need to be approved by a qualiﬁed majority, Baron (1991) shows that legislators
may propose projects whose aggregate beneﬁts are less than their costs, when these beneﬁts can be
targeted to particular districts. Related models of legislative bargaining are elaborated by Persson
and Tabellini (2000) and Austen-Smith and Banks (2005). An interesting dynamic analysis of
the problem is provided by LeBlanc, Snyder and Tripathi (2000) who argue that majority-rule
legislatures will under-invest in public goods.3 They make their argument in the context of a ﬁnite
1 This literature seeks to develop an understanding of the performance of political institutions in allocating public
resources that matches our understanding of the performance of markets in the allocation of private resources. It
includes the papers by Acemoglu (2004), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Besley and Coate (1998), Coate and
Morris (1995), (1999), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Persson and Svensson (1989), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), and
Wittman (1989).
2 Under this norm, each legislator unilaterally decides on the level of spending he would like on projects in his
own district and the aggregate level of taxation is determined by the need to balance the budget. Distributive
policy-making then becomes a pure common pool problem.
3 Velasco (1999) develops an analysis of the accumulation of public debt that models public decision-making as
a dynamic common pool problem. The key assumption of this approach is that (as in the static model of Weingast,
Shepsle and Johnsen (1981)) legislators can all choose the amount of spending they want for their constituents.
2horizon model in which in each period a legislature allocates a pool of exogenously given resources
between targeted transfers and a public investment that serves to increase the amount of revenue
available in the next period. Like us, they employ the bargaining approach to model legislative
policy-making. Our model diﬀe r sf r o mt h e i r si nt h a ti ti si n ﬁnite horizon, taxation is distortionary
and investment in public goods yields beneﬁts for more than one period. These features explain
our more nuanced set of conclusions concerning the eﬃciency of legislative policy-making.
In solving a dynamic political bargaining model, our paper also contributes to the literature
on the legislative bargaining approach.4 While most papers in this literature focus on the
choices made for a single policy period, a few have explored dynamic decision making. Baron
(1996), Baron and Herron (2003), and Kalandrakis (2004) all study dynamic models in which a
legislature makes policy choices in each period.5 In these models, the dynamic linkage across
periods is created by the assumption that today’s policy choice determines tomorrow’s default
outcome should the legislature not come to agreement. This creates complex interactions as
today’s policy-makers choose policy, taking into account the implications of shifting next period’s
status quo.6 However, in these models the policy choices in each period are purely distributive so
there are no implications for eﬃciency except in so far as citizens are risk averse.7 Our analysis
also diﬀers from these papers in that the dynamic linkage is created by the accumulation of the
stock of public goods.
Finally, our paper contributes to a small literature trying to develop inﬁnite horizon political
economy models of policy-making that incorporate rational, forward-looking decision makers. It
Thus, there is no voting on spending bills and hence no need for legislators to build coalitions to pass them.
4 This literature seeks to understand how legislatures choose policies in multi-dimensional policy-making en-
vironments where the median voter theorem cannot be applied and party attachments are weak. The approach
stems from the seminal work of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and includes the papers by Banks and Duggan (2000),
Eraslan (2002) and Eraslan and Merlo (2002). An alternative “demand bargaining” approach to the problem is
developed by Morelli (1999).
5 A recent paper related to this literature is Gomes and Jehiel (2004). They present a general model of inﬁnitely
repeated coalitional bargaining that can be interpreted as legislative bargaining. Their environment, however,
diﬀers from the rest of the literature because they assume that there are no restrictions in monetary transfers
among players, so the proposer can extract all the expected continuation values from the other players with no
limit. This assumption does not seem to ﬁt with the realities of legislative bargaining where pork transfers are
restricted to be positive and is key to their results. Moreover they study results for the asymptotic case when δ → 1.
With respect to our model, they do not study the growth path of the public good or the type of ineﬃciencies that
prevail when this condition for eﬃciency is not satisﬁed.
6 Epple and Riordan (1987) present a related analysis in which legislators take turns in being the proposer as
opposed to the proposer being randomly drawn each period. They also consider non-stationary equilibria.
7 Baron (1996) studies a one-dimensional policy space, Baron and Herron (2003) a two-dimensional policy space,
and Kalandrakis (2004) a divide-the-dollar game.
3has been well recognized in the political economy literature that many interesting issues arise
from recognizing the dynamic linkage of policies across periods. Such linkages either arise directly
as with public investment or debt, or indirectly because today’s policy choices impact citizens’
private investment decisions. However, extending standard static models to understand fully dy-
namic policy-making has proved diﬃcult, even in the case of one-dimensional policy environments.
Accordingly, most dynamic analyses employ two period models. While these have yielded many
useful insights, they do not permit the development of predictions about the dynamics of policy
choices or steady state policy levels and this has spawned the recent research eﬀort on inﬁnite
horizon models. Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) embed a negative income tax system into the neo-
classical growth model and assume that the rate of taxation is determined by the median voter
in each period. They are able to solve their model numerically and use it to make predictions
concerning the long run size of government. Using a simpler underlying economic model, Hassler,
Rodriguez Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2003) develop an overlapping generations model of
the welfare state where in each period the level of welfare beneﬁts is determined by majority
voting. They are able to provide analytical solutions of their model. Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten
and Zilibotti (2004) extend this approach to a richer economic environment in which the welfare
state provides an insurance role.8 These models diﬀer from ours in that the policy space is one-
dimensional and the dynamic linkage occurs by impacting private investment decisions. Closer to
our paper is Azzimonti Renzo (2005) who studies policy-making in an inﬁnite horizon model in
which in each period the winning political party allocates revenue between targeted group-speciﬁc
public goods and a public infrastructure good that serves to make the economy more productive
in the future. The major diﬀerence is that the winning political party is a policy dictator, and
therefore there is no need to build legislative coalitions as in our model.9
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 creates a benchmark for comparison by solving for the eﬃcient solution. The heart
of the paper is Section 4 which solves for equilibrium policy choices. Section 5 develops the
model’s implications for the eﬃciency of legislative decision-making and points out some of its
more interesting positive implications. A brief conclusion is oﬀered in Section 6. An Appendix
8 Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2003) develop a related model where tax revenues are used to ﬁnance public
goods.
9 In addition, Azzimonti Renzo is primarily interested in understanding the implications of asymmetries in the
popularity of political parties for the time path of government spending and investment.
4contains proofs of some of the more technical results.
2T h e m o d e l
A continuum of inﬁnitely lived citizens live in n identical districts indexed by i =1 ,...,n.T h es i z e
of the population in each district is normalized to be one. There are three goods - a public good
g; consumption z;a n dl a b o rl. The consumption good is produced from labor according to the
technology z = wl. The public good can be produced from the consumption good according to
the technology g = z/p. The public good is an investment good in the sense that units produced
in the current period yield beneﬁts in future periods.10 Speciﬁcally, if the level of the public good
at time t is gt and It new units are produced in period t, then the level in period t +1i s
gt+1 =( 1− d)gt + It.
The parameter d i st h ed e p r e c i a t i o nr a t eo ft h ep u b l i cg o o d .
Each citizen’s per period utility function is





where α ∈ (0,1). The parameter A measures the relative importance of the public good to the
citizens. Citizens discount future per period utilities at rate δ.
The assumptions on technology imply that the price of the public good is p and the wage rate
is w. Moreover, the quasi-linear utility speciﬁcation implies that the interest rate is ρ =1 /δ − 1.
At this interest rate, citizens have no incentive to save or borrow. At wage rate w, each citizen
will work an amount l∗(w)=( εw)ε,s ot h a tε is the elasticity of labor supply. The associated per





Public decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from each of the n
districts. One citizen from each district is selected to be that district’s representative. Since all
citizens are the same, the identity of the representative is immaterial and hence the selection
process can be ignored. The legislature meets at the beginning of each period. These meetings
10 Many public goods have this feature. Important examples are national defense activities, such as building
tanks and training troops; scientiﬁc knowledge, such as cancer research; and environmental clean ups.
5take only an insigniﬁcant amount of time, and representatives undertake private sector work in
the rest of the period just like everybody else. The aﬃrmative votes of q<nrepresentatives are
required to enact any legislation. The only way the legislature can raise funds is via a proportional
tax on labor income.11 Tax revenues can be used to ﬁnance investment in the public good, but
can also be diverted to ﬁnance targeted district-speciﬁc transfers, which are interpreted as (non-
distortionary) pork barrel spending.12
To describe how legislative decision-making works, suppose the legislature is meeting at the
beginning of a period in which the current level of the public good is g. One of the legislators
is randomly selected to make the ﬁrst policy proposal, with each representative having an equal
chance of being recognized. A proposal is described by an n + 2-tuple {r,s1,....,sn,x},w h e r er
i st h ei n c o m et a xr a t e ;si is the proposed transfer to district i’s residents; and x is the proposed
new level of the public good. The tax revenues raised under the proposal are given by R(r)=
nrwl∗(w(1 − r)) and the proposal must satisfy the budget constraint that
X
i si ≤ B(r,x;g)
where B(r,x;g)d e n o t e st h ed i ﬀerence between tax revenues and investment spending; i.e.,
B(r,x;g)=R(r) − p[x − (1 − d)g].
The set of constraints is completed by the non-negativity constraints that si ≥ 0f o re a c hd i s t r i c t
i (which rules out ﬁnancing public investment via district speciﬁcl u m ps u mt a x e s ) . 13
If the proposal is accepted by q legislators, then the plan is implemented and the legislature
adjourns until the beginning of the next period. At that time, the legislature meets again with
the only diﬀerence being that the initial level of public capital is x. If, on the other hand, the ﬁrst
proposal is not accepted, another legislator is chosen to make a proposal. There are T ≥ 2s u c h
proposal rounds, each of which takes a negligible amount of time. If the process continues until
proposal round T, and the proposal made at that stage is rejected, then a legislator is appointed to
choose a default policy. The legislator is required to choose a policy that treats districts uniformly,
meaning that if he chooses transfers, he must choose a uniform transfer that goes to all districts.14
11 For simplicity and to focus on the legislative investment decision, we abstract from the possibility of ﬁnancing
expenditures with public debt. In the conclusion, we discuss a way in which the model may be adapted to explore
the implications of government borrowing.
12 The district-speciﬁc transfers could be either direct grants to particular localities or earmarks for speciﬁc public
projects that the districts would undertake anyway. In the latter case, the earmarks would be non-distortionary
and equivalent to a direct transfer.
13 For analytical convenience, we do not impose the constraint that investment is non-negative; i.e., x ≥ (1−d)g.
Thus, we are assuming, eﬀectively, that investment is reversible.
63 The social planner’s solution
To create a normative benchmark with which to compare the political equilibrium, we begin by
describing the policies that would be chosen by a social planner whose objective was to maximize
aggregate utility. In a period in which the current level of the public good is g, the planner’s
problem is to choose a new level of the public good x, a vector of transfers (s1,....,sn), and a tax
rate r to solve the problem
maxnu(w(1 − r),g)+
X
i si + δV (x)
s.t. si ≥ 0 for all i and
X
i si ≤ B(r,x;g),
where V (x) denotes the planner’s value function.
This problem can be simpliﬁed by observing that if B(r,x;g) were positive, the planner would
want to use all the available surplus revenues to ﬁnance transfers and hence
X
i si = B(r,x;g).
Moreover, aggregate utility is independent of how the planner allocates this surplus across the
districts because citizens’ utilities are linear in consumption. Thus, we can eliminate the choice
variables (s1,....,sn) and reformulate the problem as that of choosing a new level of the public
good x and a tax rate r to solve
maxnu(w(1 − r),g)+B(r,x;g)+δV (x)
s.t. B(r,x;g) ≥ 0.
The problem in this form is fairly standard. The social planner’s value function must satisfy the
functional equation
V (g)=m a x
{r,x}
{nu(w(1 − r),g)+B(r,x;g)+δV (x):B(r,x;g) ≥ 0},
and familiar arguments can be applied to show that it exists and is diﬀerentiable, increasing and
strictly concave. From this, the properties of the optimal policy may readily be deduced.
14 This assumption guarantees that if the legislature is unable to agree on a policy proposal, the default outcome
will be eﬃcient in the sense of maximizing the legislators’ average utility, and so independent from the identity of
the last proposer. The assumption helps keep the model tractable. Nonetheless, it is important to note that when
the number of proposal rounds T is large, the particular default policy that is chosen has only a small eﬀect on
equilibrium payoﬀs, which vanishes as T →∞ .
7To understand the optimal policy, note ﬁrst that the revenue maximizing tax rate is given by
r =1 /(1 + ε) and hence the maximum level of revenue that can be raised during the period is
R(1/(1+ε)). The levels of the public good x that the planner can implement with an initial level g
are therefore given by the interval [0,(1−d)g+R(1/(1+ε))/p]. If the planner would like to invest
in the public good (i.e., x ≥ (1 − d)g) he will choose an income tax rate just suﬃcient to ﬁnance
this investment. Raising surplus revenues to ﬁnance pork barrel spending will never be optimal
because taxation is distortionary. Thus, the tax rate is r = r(x,g) where the function r(x,g)i s
implicitly deﬁned by the equality B(r,x;g) = 0. On the other hand, if the planner would like to
disinvest in the public good (i.e., x<(1 − d)g) he will redistribute the proceeds through pork
rather than through an earnings subsidy. This means that the tax rate will equal 0 (as opposed
to being negative) and B(r,x;g) > 0.
Given the properties of the value function, there will exist some critical level of the public good
b g such that for all g ≤ b g the planner will want to invest and for all g>b g he will want to disinvest.





argmax{nu(w(1 − r(x,g)),g)+δV (x)} if g ≤ b g






r(xo(g),g)i f g ≤ b g
0i f g>b g
.








After computing the derivatives on the right hand side, this can be rewritten as
δV 0(x)=[
1 − r(x,g)
1 − r(x,g)(1 + ε)
] · p.
This is the Euler equation for the planner’s problem. The term on the left hand side is the social
marginal beneﬁt of the public good and the term on the right is the social marginal cost.T h e
social marginal cost is the product of the price of the public good p and the marginal cost of public
funds. The latter always exceeds 1 and is higher the more elastic is the supply of labor and the
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Figure 1: The planner’s Problem
9greater is the tax rate.15
The planner’s solution converges to a unique steady state (ro,x o). To compute this, we ﬁrst





maxz{nu(w(1 − r(z,x)),x)+δV (z)} if x ≤ b g
nu(w,x)+p(1 − d)(x − b g)+δV ((1 − d)b g)i f x>b g
.







1−r(xo(x),x)(1+ε)p(1 − d)i f x ≤ b g
nAαxα−1 + p(1 − d)i f x>b g
.
To understand this note that there are two future beneﬁts of investing more in the public good.
First, public good consumption is higher in the next period. Second, less investment will be
necessary next period or, if x>b g, more disinvestment will be possible. The ﬁrst term in the
expression measures the former eﬀect and the second term the latter. The size of the latter eﬀect
depends on whether x is larger or smaller than b g. If less investment is necessary next period, this
will mean a lower tax rate. If more disinvestment is possible, this will mean a larger transfer. The
value of a tax rate reduction is greater than an equally costly transfer increase because taxation
is distortionary. While the expressions diﬀer, however, it is important to note that the social
marginal beneﬁt of the public good is continuous at x = b g because r(xo(b g),b g)=0 .
At a steady state, we have that xo = xo(xo) which must mean that xo < b g.S u b s t i t u t i n gi n
the expression for the social marginal beneﬁt of the public good into the Euler equation, it follows
that at a steady state
δ[nAα(xo)α−1 +
1 − r(xo,x o)
1 − r(xo,x o)(1 + ε)
p(1 − d)] =
1 − r(xo,x o)
1 − r(xo,x o)(1 + ε)
· p. (1)
It is easy to verify that this equation has a unique solution and this is the planner’s steady state
level of the public good. The steady state tax rate is given by ro = r(xo,x o).
Although the analysis of the planner’s problem is relatively standard, it is useful to have a
graphical representation of the solution. This will set the stage for the more complicated political
equilibrium. Figure 1.a shows the Euler equation. The decreasing function is the social marginal
15 The “marginal cost of public funds” represents the social cost of raising an additional $1 of tax revenue. The
diﬀerence between the marginal cost of public funds and $1 is a measure of the distortions taxation is creating.
10beneﬁt of the public good δV 0(x). The increasing functions are the social marginal costs evaluated
at diﬀerent initial public capital levels. Note that these curves are always above p since r(x,g) ≥
0. The intersection of these two loci gives us the planner’s investment choice xo(g), which is
represented in Figure 1.b. This curve is increasing on [0,b g] and constant thereafter. It can be
shown to have a slope less than 1 and hence intersects the 45o line once. This intersection identiﬁes
the steady state level xo. It is apparent from the Figure that from any initial level the equilibrium
level of the public good converges monotonically to the steady state xo. The tax rate can be shown
to be monotonically decreasing if, as seems natural, the economy starts out with a public good
level lower than the steady state level.
4 Political equilibrium
We look for stationary equilibria in which any representative selected to propose at proposal round
τ ∈ {1,...,T} of the meeting at some time t uses a proposal strategy that depends only on the
current level of the public good. We focus on symmetric equilibria in which each representative
use the same proposal strategy and treats the other representatives anonymously. Such equilibria
are characterized by a collection of functions: {rτ(g), sτ(g), xτ(g)}T
τ=1.H e r erτ(g)i st h ei n c o m e
tax rate that is proposed at round τ when the initial level of the public good is g and xτ(g)i s
the new level of public good. The proposer also oﬀers a transfer of sτ(g) to the districts of q − 1
randomly selected representatives where q is the size of a minimum winning coalition.16 Any
remaining tax revenues are used to provide pork for his own district. As standard in the literature
on legislative bargaining, we assume that legislators do not use weakly dominated strategies when
voting for a policy proposal: so they vote in favor if and only if their utility under the proposal is
at least as large as their continuation value in the event it is rejected. We focus, without loss of
generality, on equilibria in which at each round τ proposals are immediately accepted by at least
q legislators, so that on the equilibrium path, no meeting lasts more than one proposal round.17
Accordingly, the policies that are actually implemented in equilibrium are described by {r1(g),
16 In our model, while the proposer is free to oﬀer transfers to more than q − 1 representatives, there is no loss
in generality in considering only minimal winning coalitions since in no stationary equilibrium would the proposer
ﬁnd it optimal to oﬀer transfers to more than q − 1 representatives.
17 Since there is no discounting within bargaining stages, there are equilibria in which, in correspondence to
some state, a proposal may be rejected at some stage τ and accepted at a later stage τ0 ≤ T. Without loss
of generality, however, we can ignore these equilibria, since they would be payoﬀ equivalent to equilibria with
immediate agreement.
11s1(g), x1(g)}.
To be more precise, {rτ(g), sτ(g), xτ(g)}T
τ=1 is an equilibrium if at each proposal round τ and
all public good levels g ≥ 0, the equilibrium proposal maximizes the proposer’s payoﬀ subject
to the incentive constraint of getting the required number of aﬃrmative votes and the feasibility
constraint that transfers be non-negative. Formally, (rτ(g), sτ(g), xτ(g)) must solve the problem
max
(r,s,x)
u(w(1 − r),g)+B(r,x;g) − (q − 1)s + δv1(x)
subject to
u(w(1 − r),g)+s + δv1(x) ≥ vτ+1(g),
B(r,x;g) ≥ (q − 1)s,a n ds ≥ 0,
where v1(x) is the legislators’ round one value function (which describes the expected future
payoﬀ of a legislator at the beginning of a period in which the current level of public good is x)
and vτ+1(g) is the expected future payoﬀ of a legislator in the out-of-equilibrium event that the
proposal at round τ is rejected. The ﬁrst constraint is the incentive constraint and the latter two
are the feasibility constraints.





To understand this recall that a legislator is chosen to propose in round one with probability 1/n.
If chosen to propose, he obtains a payoﬀ in that period of
u(w(1 − r1(g)),g)+B(r1(g),x 1(g);g) − (q − 1)s1(g).
If he is not chosen to propose, but is included in the minimum winning coalition, he obtains a payoﬀ
of u(w(1−r1(g)),g)+s1(g) and if he is not included he obtains a payoﬀ of just u(w(1−r1(g)),g).
The probability that he will be included in the minimum winning coalition, conditional on not
being chosen to propose, is (q − 1)/(n − 1). Taking expectations, the pork barrel transfers s1(g)
cancel and the period payoﬀ i sa sd e s c r i b e di n( 2 ) .
For all proposal rounds τ =1 ,..,T −1 the expected future payoﬀ of a legislator if the round τ





12This reﬂects the assumption that the round τ + 1 proposal will be accepted. Recall that if the
round T proposal is rejected, the assumption is that a legislator is appointed to choose policy and
that he must choose a uniform policy which, if it involves transfers, must make the same transfer






+ δv1(x):B(r,x;g) ≥ 0}.
An equilibrium {rτ(g), sτ(g), xτ(g)}T
τ=1 is said to be concave if the associated round one
legislators’ value function v1(g) is strictly concave. We will restrict attention to concave equilibria
in what follows and henceforth when we refer to an equilibrium it should be understood to be
concave.18 Note also that economy-wide aggregate utility in an equilibrium is given by nv1(g).
This follows from the fact that each district has a population of size 1 and citizens obtain the
same payoﬀsa st h e i rr e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
Our analysis of political equilibrium is divided into three parts. We begin by assuming that an
equilibrium exists and characterize what the equilibrium policy proposals must look like. We then
show that there are three possible types of equilibrium, each of which has distinct dynamics and
ad i ﬀerent steady state. Finally, we will establish the conditions under which each of these three














Basically, this requires that the tax base of the economy be not so large that a minimum winning
coalition of legislators could accumulate their desired level of the public good in a single period.
The role this assumption plays will become apparent shortly.
4.1 The equilibrium policy proposals
The basic structure of the equilibrium policy proposals is easily understood. To get support for
his proposal, the proposer must obtain the votes of q − 1 other representatives. Accordingly,
given that utility is transferable, he is eﬀectively making decisions to maximize the utility of q
legislators. The optimal policy will depend on the state variable g. If the stock of the public good
18 As we will prove, a concave equilibrium always exists in our model. Although we could not ﬁnd an example
of a non-concave equilibrium, we have not formally proven that such an equilibrium can not exist.
13is suﬃciently low, then even though the proposer is only taking into account the well-being of q
legislators, he will still not want to divert resources to transfers. Transfers require either reduced
public investment or increased taxation and when the stock of the public good is low, the marginal
beneﬁt of public investment and the marginal cost of taxation are both too high to make transfers
attractive. The proposer will therefore choose the tax rate - public investment pair that maximizes
collective utility and the outcome will be as if he is maximizing the utility of the legislature as a
whole. Once the stock of the public good becomes suﬃciently large, then the opportunity cost of
transfers is lessened and the collective utility of the q legislators will be maximized by diverting
some resources to pork. Accordingly, the proposer will propose pork for the districts associated
with his minimum winning coalition.
In any equilibrium, therefore, there will exists a threshold level of the public good that divides
the state space into two ranges. In the lower range, in every proposal round, the proposer will
propose a unanimous coalition solution in which the policy proposal maximizes aggregate legislator
utility implying that no revenues are devoted to pork. These proposals will be supported by the
entire legislature. In the upper range, in every proposal round the proposer chooses a minimum
winning coalition solution in which the proposer provides pork for his own district and those
of a minimum winning coalition of representatives. The tax rate-investment pair maximizes the
aggregate utility of q legislators, given that they appropriate all the surplus revenues. The transfer
paid out to coalition members is just suﬃcient to make them in favor of accepting the proposal.
Thus, only those legislators whose districts receive pork vote for these proposals.
This discussion motivates:
Proposition 1: Let {rτ(g), sτ(g), xτ(g)}T
τ=1 be an equilibrium with associated value function
v1(g). Then there exists g∗(v1) > 0 such that: (i) if g ∈ [0,g∗(v1)]
(rτ(g),s τ(g),x τ(g)) = (r(x∗(g;v1),g),0,x ∗(g;v1)) for all τ =1 ,...,T,
where r(x,g) is the tax rate function from the analysis of the planner’s problem and
x∗(g;v1) = argmax
x {u(w(1 − r(x,g)),g)+δv1(x)};
and (ii) if g ∈ (g∗(v1),∞)
(rτ(g),x τ(g)) = (r∗,x ∗(v1)) for all τ =1 ,...,T,
14where
(r∗,x ∗(v1)) = argmax
(r,x)







n for all τ =1 ,...,T − 1
vT+1(g) − u(w(1 − r∗),g) − δv1(x∗(v1)) for τ = T
The threshold level of the public good is g∗(v1) and the Proposition tells us that the tax rate -
public investment pair proposed in each proposal round will maximize aggregate legislator utility







x {δqv1(x) − px}.
Thus, both the tax rate and level of the public good proposed in the minimum winning coalition
range are independent of the existing level of the public good and, furthermore, the tax rate is
independent of the value function. Another useful fact is that at g = g∗(v1), the unanimous and
minimum winning coalition solutions coincide so that
(r(x∗(g∗(v1);v1),g∗(v1)),0,x ∗(g∗(v1);v1)) = (r∗,0,x ∗(v1)). (3)
This implies that B(x∗(v1),r ∗;g∗(v1)) = 0, an observation that permits the computation of the
threshold value g∗(v1)o n c ex∗(v1)i sk n o w n .
Proposition 1 provides us with the basic picture of what the equilibrium proposals look like.
The next step is to obtain more information about the function x∗(g;v1) and the public good level
x∗(v1). Since these obviously depend upon the nature of the equilibrium value function, we must





maxy{u(w(1 − r(y,x)),x)+δv1(y)} if x ≤ g∗(v1)
u(w(1 − r∗),x)+
B(r∗,x∗(v1);x)
n + δv1(x∗(v1)) if x>g ∗(v1)
.
15As we will see, this value function is diﬀerentiable everywhere except at g = g∗(v1).19 Thus, by










n )i f x<g ∗(v1)
Aαxα−1 +
p(1−d)
n if x>g ∗(v1)
.
The equilibrium value function has a kink at g∗(v1) in the sense that the left hand derivative
limx%g∗(v1) v0
1(x) exceeds the right hand derivative limx&g∗(v1) v0
1(x). This reﬂects the fact that
the value of an additional unit of public good is lower in the minimum winning coalition range.
As in the planner’s problem, there are two sources of future beneﬁts from investing more in the
public good. First, public good consumption is higher in the next period. Second, less investment
will be necessary next period. The beneﬁts from the ﬁrst eﬀe c ta r et h es a m ew h e t h e ro rn o tt h e
legislature is choosing to make transfers in the next period, but the beneﬁts of the second eﬀect
do depend on this choice. In the unanimous coalition case, the lower investment translates into
a lower tax rate. With minimum winning coalitions, it means higher transfers. But the value of
a tax rate reduction is greater than the value of an equally expensive transfer increase because
taxes are distortionary and hence the kink.
We can now use the expression for the slope of the value function to characterize the function









This ﬁrst order condition reﬂects the fact that any increase in public good investment must
be ﬁnanced by an increase in taxes. Thus, the increase is worthwhile if and only if the per
capita beneﬁt of an additional unit of public good δv0




n). The latter is the product of the per capita cost of the public good and the marginal
cost of public funds.
There are three cases to be considered. The ﬁrst is that at g∗(v1) the discounted right hand
derivative of the value function exceeds the per capita tax cost. In this case, δv0
1(x)m u s te q u a l
the per capita tax cost in the minimum winning coalition range. Accordingly, x∗(g;v1) exceeds
19 As it will be clear from the proof of Proposition 4, this follows by standard arguments (see Stokey, Lucas and
Prescott [1989]).











The second case is that at g∗(v1) the left hand derivative of the value function is less than the tax
cost. In this case, δv0
1(x) must equal the tax cost in the unanimous coalition range. Accordingly,
x∗(g;v1) is smaller than g∗(v1)a n ds a t i s ﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
δ[Aαxα−1 +(
1 − r(x∗(x;v1),x)











The third case is that the tax cost lies between the left and right hand derivatives of the value
function at g∗(v1). In this case, we must have that x∗(g;v1)=g∗(v1).







This ﬁrst order condition reﬂects the fact that any increase in public good investment simply
reduces the amount of transfers received by the q representatives in the minimum winning coalition.
Thus, the increase is worthwhile if and only if the per capita beneﬁt of an additional unit of public
good δv0
1(x) exceeds the per capita transfer cost to coalition members which is p/q.
There are again three cases. The ﬁr s ti st h a ta tg∗(v1) the discounted right hand derivative
of the value function exceeds the transfer cost p/q.I n t h i s c a s e , δv0
1(x)m u s te q u a lp/q in the









The second possibility is that the left hand derivative at g∗(v1)i sl e s st h a np/q.I n t h i s c a s e ,
δv0
1(x)m u s te q u a lt h et r a n s f e rc o s ti nt he unanimity range. Accordingly, x∗(v1)m u s tb es m a l l e r
than g∗(v1) and must satisfy the ﬁrst order condition
δ[Aαxα−1 +(
1 − r(x∗(x,v1),x)








The third possibility is that p/q lies between the left and right hand derivatives of the value
function at g∗(v1) .I nw h i c hc a s ew em u s th a v et h a tx∗(v1)=g∗(v1).
174.2 The three types of equilibrium
We can now bring the information just obtained about the function x∗(g;v1) and the public good
level x∗(v1) together with Proposition 1 to get a picture of how equilibrium plays out. There
are three possibilities to be considered. In a Type I equilibrium, x∗(v1) exceeds g∗(v1), so that if
the current level of the public good is in the minimum winning coalition range, the equilibrium
investment decision will be such as to keep it there. In a Type II equilibrium, x∗(v1)i sl e s st h a n
g∗(v1), so that in the minimum winning coalition range, the equilibrium investment decision will
be such as to put the public good level back in the interior of the unanimity range. In a Type III
equilibrium, x∗(v1)i se q u a lt og∗(v1) so that the equilibrium investment decision will be such as
to put the public good level back at the boundary of the two ranges. We consider each in turn.
4.2.1 Type I equilibrium














This gives us closed form solutions for x∗(v1)a n dg∗(v1). For this equilibrium to exist, the
parameters of the model must be such as to imply that x∗(v1) is indeed greater than g∗(v1)a n d
we will give a condition for this below.
It remains to describe the behavior of x∗(g;v1). From (3) we know that at g = g∗(v1)i tm u s t





n) will equal p/q at x equal to x∗(v1). Now deﬁne the public good levels





1 − r(g∗(v1),b g)



















Observe that g0 < b g<g ∗(v1).
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Figure 2: Type I equilibrium: x∗(v1) >g ∗(v1)
19On the interval [b g,g∗(v1)], x∗(g;v1) is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst order condition (4). It
is increasing in g and exceeds g∗(v1). Eﬀectively in this part of the unanimity range, the public
good is suﬃciently valuable that the aggregate utility of the legislators is maximized by choosing
a level of investment that will induce pork to be distributed in the next period. On the interval
[g0,b g], x∗(g;v1) is constant and equal to g∗(v1). Here the proposer is deterred from investing more
than g∗(v1) because it will result in a minimum winning coalition solution in the next period.
Finally, on the interval [0,g0], x∗(g;v1) is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst order condition (5) and
is less than g∗(v1). In this range, the proposer chooses the level of investment that maximizes
aggregate legislator utility knowing that in the next period the proposer will do the same.
The situation is illustrated in Figure 2. In panel (a) the vertical axis measures units of consump-
tion and the horizontal axis measures units of x. The downward sloping line with the discontinuity
at g∗(v1)i sδv0
1(x) and hence represents the per capita beneﬁt of an additional unit of the public
good. The horizontal line p/q represents the per capita marginal cost in the minimum winning




n) represent the per capita mar-
ginal cost of the public good in the unanimity range. Lower initial levels of the public good shift
these lines to the left.
The minimum winning coalition public good level is determined by the intersection of the
marginal beneﬁtc u r v ea n dt h ec u r v ep/q.G i v e n t h a t x∗(v1) exceeds g∗(v1), the intersection
must occur to the right of g∗(v1) as illustrated. The function x∗(g;v1) is determined by the




n). At g = g∗(v1),
this intersection occurs at x∗(v1). As we lower g the marginal cost curve shifts leftward and we
trace out successively lower levels of x.I n t h e i n t e r v a l [ g0,b g], lowering g has no impact on the
level of the public good that is chosen. On the interval [0,g0], the marginal cost curve intersects
the upper branch of the marginal beneﬁtc u r v ea n dx∗(g;v1) once again decreases as we lower the
initial level of the public good.
Panel (b) of Figure 2 uses this information about x∗(g;v1)a n dx∗(v1) to graph the equilibrium
level of x as a function of the state variable g.T h i sc u r v ei n t e r s e c t st h e4 5 o line at x∗(v1). It is
apparent from this Figure that from any initial condition the equilibrium level of the public good
converges monotonically to the steady state x∗(v1). The steady state tax rate is r∗. In the steady
state, the proposer raises more revenue than necessary to maintain the public good level at x∗(v1)
and this revenue is used to ﬁnance pork. Thus we have:
20Proposition 2: Let {rτ(g), sτ(g), xτ(g)}T
τ=1 be a Type I equilibrium. Then, the equilibrium level







In this steady state, in each period the districts of a minimum winning coalition of representatives
receive pork.
4.2.2 Type II equilibrium
If x∗(v1)i sl e s st h a ng∗(v1) ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tx∗(v1)s a t i s ﬁes the ﬁrst order condition (7).
This is not a closed form solution for x∗(v1), since it depends upon x∗(x∗(v1),v 1). Turning to
x∗(g;v1), we know from (3) that at g = g∗(v1)i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tx∗(g;v1)=x∗(v1). On the
interval [0,g∗(v1)], x∗(g;v1) is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst order condition (5). It is increasing
over this range and thus less than g∗(v1). Accordingly, the proposer chooses the optimal level
of investment knowing that in the next period the proposer will also be maximizing aggregate
legislator utility.
The situation is illustrated in Figure 3. The interpretation of the various curves in panel (a)
are as for Figure 2(a). Given that x∗(v1)i sl e s st h a ng∗(v1), the intersection of the marginal
beneﬁtc u r v ea n dt h ec u r v ep/q must occur to the left of g∗(v1) as illustrated. The function





n). At g = g∗(v1), this intersection occurs at x∗(v1). As we lower g the
marginal cost curve shifts leftward and we trace out successively lower levels of x.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 uses this information about x∗(g;v1)a n dx∗(v1) to graph the equilibrium
level of x as a function of the initial public good level g. This curve intersects the 45o line at
b x. It is apparent from this Figure that from any initial level of the public good the equilibrium
converges monotonically to the steady state b x. The steady state tax rate is b r = r(b x,b x). The
steady state (b r,b x) involves no pork and satisﬁes:
δ[Aαb xα−1 +(
1 − b r
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I tf o l l o w sf r o m( 1 )t h a t( b r,b x) must equal the planner’s steady state. This yields:
Proposition 3: Let {rτ(g), sτ(g), xτ(g)}T
τ=1 be a Type II equilibrium. Then, the equilibrium
level of the public good and tax rate converge monotonically to the planner’s steady state (ro,x o).
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Figure 3: Type II equilibrium: x∗(v1) <g ∗(v1)
224.2.3 Type III equilibrium
















Turning to x∗(g;v1), we know that at g = g∗(v1)i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tx∗(g;v1)=g∗(v1).
Now deﬁne the public good level g0 from the equation
δ[Aαg∗(v1)α−1 +(
1 − r(g∗(v1),g∗(v1))











It is the case that g0 <g ∗(v1). On the interval [g0,g∗(v1)], x∗(g;v1) is constant and equal to
g∗(v1). Here the proposer is deterred from investing more than g∗(v1) because it will result in
a minimum winning coalition solution being selected in the next period. On the interval [0,g0],
x∗(g;v1) is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst order condition (5) and is less than g∗(v1). In this range,
the proposer chooses the optimal level of investment knowing that in the next period the proposer
will also be maximizing aggregate legislator utility.
The situation is illustrated in Figure 4. Given that x∗(v1)e q u a l sg∗(v1), the curve p/q must
intersect the marginal beneﬁt curve at the point of discontinuity as illustrated in panel (a). The




n) will equal p/q at x equal to
g∗(v1). As we lower g, the marginal cost curve shifts leftward but on the interval [g0,g∗(v1)] this
has no impact on the level of the public good that is chosen. On the interval [0,g0], the marginal
cost curve intersects the upper branch of the marginal beneﬁtc u r v ea n dx∗(g;v1)d e c r e a s e sa st h e
initial level of the public good is lowered.
Panel (b) of Figure 4 graphs the equilibrium level of x as a function of the initial public good
level g. This curve intersects the 45o line at g∗(v1). It is apparent from this Figure that from any
initial condition the equilibrium converges monotonically to the steady state g∗(v1). The steady
state tax rate is r∗ which also equals r(g∗(v1),g∗(v1)). This steady state involves no pork, but is
not the planner’s steady state. Thus we have:
Proposition 4: Let {rτ(g), sτ(g), xτ(g)}T
τ=1 be a Type III equilibrium. Then, the equilibrium
levels of the public good and tax rate converge monotonically to the steady state (r∗,
R(r∗)
pd ). In this
steady state, no districts receive pork.
23q
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Figure 4: Type III equilibrium: x∗(v1)=g∗(v1)
244.3 Existence, uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibria
The foregoing analysis has provided a complete characterization of equilibrium. It has shown that
there are three possible types of equilibrium and has described the dynamics of the equilibrium
policy proposals in each case. Moreover, it solved for the steady state levels of public goods and
taxes in each case. It remains to establish the conditions under which each type of equilibrium
exists. There are two main questions of interest. First, does an equilibrium always exist and,
second, is it possible that two or more types of equilibria can co-exist?
Recall that A parameterizes the value of the public good to the citizens. Deﬁne A to be the
value of A that makes the marginal beneﬁt of the public good in the minimum winning coalition











Similarly, let A be the value of A that makes the marginal beneﬁt of the public good in the














Notice that A must be less than A since, holding constant preferences, the marginal beneﬁto ft h e
public good is higher in the unanimity range. Then we have the following result:
Proposition 5: (i) If A ∈ (0,A) there is a unique equilibrium and this equilibrium is a Type
I equilibrium. (ii) If A>A there is a unique equilibrium and this equilibrium is a Type II
equilibrium. (iii) If A ∈ [A,A] there are three equilibria, one of each type.
Thus, there always exists an equilibrium and, for a range of the parameter space, all of the
three types of equilibria discussed above co-exist.20 Multiple equilibria arise because there are
complementarities between the public good decisions of diﬀerent proposers in diﬀerent periods.
Consider a proposer deciding whether to use p units of tax revenue to purchase an additional
unit of the public good or to ﬁnance pork for the districts of a minimum winning coalition of
representatives. The gain from the latter strategy is p/q. As already noted, the gain from the
20 It should also be noted that for a range of the parameter space ((0,A)∪(A,∞)) the equilibrium is unique (at
least in the class of symmetric Markov equilibria with concave value functions). Previous research in the legislative
bargaining literature has provided uniqueness results for Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) static model (Eraslan (2002)).
Uniqueness is perhaps more surprising in a dynamic model where the bargaining process may lead to ineﬃcient
outcomes because of the complementarities discussed above.
25former strategy can be decomposed into two parts. One part is deterministic and directly aﬀects
the proposer’s future utility: investing in an additional unit of public good generates a beneﬁto f
Aαgα−1 in the following period, independently of the behavior of other representatives. But the
other part depends on the strategy used by representatives in the future. If the representatives
in the future are “virtuous,” they respond to the reduced need to invest in the public good by
imposing a lower tax rate. If they are not virtuous, they respond by increasing pork barrel
spending. Virtuous behavior increases the incentives to invest in the public good and, in this way,
is self-reinforcing.
5I m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e m o d e l
The results of the previous section provide a complete picture of what political equilibrium looks
like. In this section, we draw out some of the implications of the model. We ﬁrst discuss what
it tells us about the eﬃciency of legislative decision-making and then turn to some of its positive
implications.
5.1 The eﬃciency of political equilibrium
To understand the model’s implications concerning eﬃciency, we will focus on a comparison of the
equilibrium and planner’s steady states. We will refer to the steady state levels of the public good
and tax rate in the planner’s solution as “the eﬃcient levels”. This is motivated by the fact that the
planner’s solution is the unique Pareto eﬃcient policy sequence in the set of policy sequences that
provide all citizens with the same expected payoﬀ. Since all citizens have the same expected payoﬀ
in political equilibrium, divergencies between equilibrium and planner’s steady states represent
Pareto ineﬃciencies and thereby constitute “political failures” in the sense deﬁn e db yB e s l e ya n d
Coate (1998).
We begin by understanding how the equilibrium steady state diﬀers from the planner’s in the
three types of equilibrium. For the Type I equilibrium we can show:
Lemma 1: Let {rτ(g), sτ(g), xτ(g)}T
τ=1 be a Type I equilibrium. Then, the steady state public
good level is below the eﬃcient level. Moreover, the steady state tax rate is above the eﬃcient level
if A ∈ (0,A) and below it if A ∈ (A,A].
Thus, public goods are always under-provided in this type of equilibrium, but the overall size
of government as measured by the tax rate may be below or above the eﬃcient level. When
26A ∈ (0,A) this type of equilibrium reﬂects well the conventional wisdom concerning legislative
decision-making. Namely, that it results in government being too large in the sense that taxes
are higher than the eﬃcient level and, in addition, that these tax revenues are misallocated, with
public goods being under-provided and pork being over-provided. When A ∈ (A,A]( a n dw ea r e
in a Type I equilibrium) the picture diﬀers from the conventional one because government is below
its eﬃcient scale, although revenues are still misallocated to pork.
We know from Proposition 2, that for the Type II equilibrium, the equilibrium and eﬃcient
steady states coincide. This just leaves the Type III equilibrium, for which we can establish:
Lemma 2: Let {rτ(g), sτ(g), xτ(g)}T
τ=1 be a Type III equilibrium. Then, the steady state public
good level is below the eﬃcient level.
Since there is no pork in the Type III equilibrium, this result implies that the overall size of
government is below optimal. The nature of the ineﬃciency therefore diﬀers completely from
that suggested by the conventional wisdom. Government is not only too small, but available tax
revenues are allocated eﬃciently. The legislature is not willing to choose a public good level higher
than g∗(v1) because they know that the public good level will go back down to g∗(v1)t h en e x t
period, so there will be only one period of additional public good consumption. Moreover, the
extra revenues that will be saved by not having to purchase as much public good in the next
period will just be spent on transfers rather than reducing taxes. Spending on transfers is less
eﬃcient in an ex-ante sense than reducing taxes because of the deadweight cost of taxation.
Combining the results of Lemmas 1 and 2 and Propositions 2-5, the eﬃciency implications of
the model can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 6: If A<Athen the steady state equilibrium tax rate is too high and the steady
state equilibrium level of public goods is too low. If A>A, then the steady state equilibrium is
eﬃcient. If A ∈ [A,A] then the steady state equilibrium could be eﬃcient or ineﬃcient. If it is
ineﬃcient, there are two possibilities. In the ﬁrst, the tax rate will be too low but revenues will be
allocated eﬃciently. In the second, the tax rate will also be too low and some revenues will be used
to ﬁnance pork.
What are the basic reasons for the ineﬃciencies in policy-making that can arise in the model?
Four factors are crucial in the sense that, without them, the equilibrium policy choices would
be Pareto eﬃcient. The ﬁrst is majoritarian decision making. With unanimity (i.e., q = n), it
27i st h ec a s et h a tA = A = 0 which implies that the political equilibrium is always eﬃcient.21
Majoritarian decision making allows legislative coalitions to beneﬁt their districts at the expense
of non-coalition members. The second is the availability of distributive policies; i.e., policies
whose beneﬁts can be targeted narrowly and whose costs are ﬁnanced centrally. If there were no
such policies, there would be no way for majoritarian coalitions to transfer wealth to themselves.
The third factor is political uncertainty arising from the random allocation of proposal power.
If the proposer was constant over time, the political equilibrium would certainly diﬀer from the
planner’s solution, but it would be Pareto eﬃcient. In particular, it would not be possible to
make the citizens in the proposer’s district better oﬀ.T h e ﬁnal factor is lack of commitment.
The ineﬃciencies in both the Type I and III equilibria could be resolved by Coasian bargaining
between present and future legislators. However, such Coasian bargains are not possible because
the identity of future legislators is not clear and even if it were, future promises would not be
credible.
In interpreting Proposition 6, it is important not to over-simplify the conclusions concerning
the role of the public good taste parameter A. It may seem unsurprising that when A is high
enough, the political equilibrium is eﬃcient. After all, the higher is the beneﬁt of the public good,
the higher is the incentive to invest in it, independently of the decision making process. In our
model, however, the consequences of A for eﬃciency are indirect and more subtle than this. In a
static model, the marginal beneﬁt of the public good necessarily depends only on the exogenous
parameters such as A: a high enough level of A would imply that the marginal beneﬁto fg is higher
than the marginal beneﬁt of pork transfers, and therefore that all tax revenues would be used for
g. But in our dynamic model, the marginal beneﬁt of investing in the public good is endogenous
because it depends on the level accumulated in previous periods. As A becomes higher, the long
run level of the public good increases as more accumulation takes place: this compensates for the
higher level of A by reducing the marginal beneﬁt of investment. For this reason, a high absolute
value of A is not suﬃcient to guarantee the equilibrium level of the public good is eﬃcient. For
example, as the depreciation rate d converges to 0, both A and A converge to inﬁnity (see the
proof of Proposition 7). Thus, the equilibrium is ineﬃcient when d is very small, irrespective of
the level of A.T h i sr e ﬂects the fact that when d is very small, if the equilibrium were eﬃcient,
there would be almost no investment in g and therefore close to zero taxes in the steady state. But
21 Indeed, generally there will exist some critical e q<nsuch that if q ≥ e q, legislative policy-making is eﬃcient.
28this cannot happen because when taxes are close to zero the marginal deadweight cost of taxation
is close to zero, so it would always be optimal to raise taxes to fund pork barrel transfers. In the
steady state, therefore, we have an eﬃcient equilibrium only when the long run level of investment
is high enough to imply that the (endogenous) deadweight cost of taxation is higher than the
marginal beneﬁt of pork transfers. This suggests that we should expect eﬃcient equilibria not
only when the depreciation of public goods is high, but also when there is sustained technological
progress that favors high long run levels of public good investments.
Under what circumstances is the political equilibrium more likely to be ineﬃcient? Proposition
6 suggests that a feel for this can be obtained by studying how the critical public good preference
thresholds A and A depend upon the underlying parameters. Ceteris paribus, factors that serve to
raise A and A make ineﬃciency more likely. The relevant parameters of interest are the discount
rate δ, the price of the public good p, the rate of depreciation d and the size of the majority
required to pass legislation q. Also of interest is the elasticity of labor supply ε. When analyzing
this, however, one must recognize that the laissez-faire national income at wage w is nw(εw)ε and
hence raising the elasticity of labor supply ε increases the size of the tax base. To circumvent this,
we consider compensated changes in the elasticity; i.e., changes in ε compensated by changes in w
that leave the size of the tax base constant. We now have:
Proposition 7: An increase in the price of the public good p or the economy’s wage rate w induces
an increase in A and A, while an increase in either the discount rate δ or the required majority
q induces a decrease in A and A. A compensated increase in the elasticity of labor supply ε also
induces a decrease in A and A.
Thus, political equilibrium is more likely to be ineﬃcient when citizens are more impatient,
public goods are more expensive and the private sector is more productive. On the other hand,
equilibrium is more likely to be eﬃcient when super-majorities are required to pass tax and
spending bills and when the elasticity of labor supply is high. The latter result is particularly
interesting and reﬂects the logic that when tax revenues are more costly to raise, they will be less
likely to be squandered on pork.
The proposition does not speak to the impact of an increase in the depreciation rate because
it is ambiguous. While A and A are decreasing in d for suﬃciently small d, the derivatives may
switch sign at larger d. However, there are two interesting facts to note about the depreciation
29rate. First, as noted above, as d converges to 0, both A and A converge to inﬁnity. Thus, the
equilibrium must be ineﬃcient when d is very small and the ineﬃciency takes the conventional
form in which the steady state tax rate is too high and revenues are misallocated to pork. Second,
when d =1 ,A = A and the third type of equilibrium cannot arise. This reﬂects the fact that
there is no diﬀerence between the marginal beneﬁt of investment in the unanimity and minimum
winning coalition ranges when depreciation is 100%. In particular, investing more in the public
good leads to no tax or transfer changes in the next period, because none of the extra investment
carries over to the next period. Moreover, Assumption 1 implies that when d =1 ,A>A,m e a n i n g
that the equilibrium must be eﬃcient.22
5.2 Some positive implications
The ﬁrst interesting positive implication of the model concerns the dynamics of legislative coali-
tions. Consider the case in which A<Aso that the steady state involves under-provision of the
public good and over-taxation. In the steady state, budgets will be approved only by a minimum
winning coalition of representatives. However, assuming that the economy started out with a
suﬃciently low level of the public good, in the early phases of governance as the public good was
accumulated, the legislature would not have engaged in distributive policy-making and budgets
would have been approved unanimously. Thus, the model suggests that we might observe a decline
over time in both the quality of government and the degree of consensus in the legislature. Re-
latedly, starting from a steady state in which budgets are passed by minimum winning coalitions,
if the value of the public good increases very dramatically (for example, as result of a new mili-
tary threat), we would expect to see a shift to unanimous coalitions as the legislature ramps up
investment in the public good.
A second interesting implication concerns the elasticity of labor supply. Consider two societies
that diﬀer only in the elasticity of their citizens’ labor supply (ε0 and ε1) and their wage levels
(w0 and w1). Suppose the wage levels across the two communities are such as to make the size of
the laissez-faire national income the same (i.e., w0(ε0w0)ε0 equals w1(ε1w1)ε1). Finally, suppose
that in both societies, the steady state involves under-provision of the public good and excessive
22 In assuming that public investment increases the revenue available for redistribution in the next period,
Leblanc, Snyder and Tripathi (2000) eﬀectively assume that d = 1. Moreover, their assumption that the pool
of available revenue the legislature has available is always suﬃcient to ﬁnance the surplus maximizing level of
investment (p.29) is the exact opposite of Assumption 1. This explains why their model has a unique ineﬃcient
equilibrium.
30taxation (i.e., A<min{A0,A 1}). Then, the steady state level of public goods will be the same in
both societies, but the tax rate will be lower in the society with a higher elasticity of labor supply.
Thus, the citizens in the society with the low elasticity would be better oﬀ with the public good
- tax rate pair that arises in the society with the high elasticity.23 In this sense, societies where
citizens have a high elasticity of labor supply will have better quality governments.
Finally, consider the implications of an increase in the productivity of the private sector as
measured by the wage rate w. Assuming that the steady state involves pork, an increase in w has
no impact on the size of government as measured by the tax rate nor on the steady state level
of the public good. However, because tax revenues are higher, the amount of pork is increased
and the quality of government is lower. Compare this with the implications of an increase in the
productivity of public spending as measured by A. Again, assuming that the steady state involves
pork, a small increase in A has no impact on the size of government but does increase the quality
of government by raising the level of the public good. Thus, increases in private productivity
worsen the quality of government, while increases in public productivity improve it.
6 Conclusion
This paper has presented an inﬁnite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which
policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from geographically deﬁned
districts. In each period, policies are determined by legislative bargaining. The model incorporates
both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation. The dynamic linkage
across policy-making periods is created by the fact that the productive spending has long run
beneﬁts. Despite the fact that the policy space is quite rich, the model is tractable. Key to
this tractability is that, distributive policies not withstanding, all citizens are ex ante identical at
the beginning of each period so equilibrium can be summarized by a single value function. This
permits a particularly clean analysis of the welfare properties of equilibrium.
The welfare analysis sheds new light on the eﬃciency of politically determined policy choices.
First, it provides a rigorous formal underpinning for the conventional wisdom that legislatures in
which representatives are elected by geographically deﬁned districts will produce a long run size
of government that is too large and long run levels of national public goods that are too low.
23 The public good - tax rate pair in the high elasticity society will necessarily be feasible for the low elasticity
society, because the tax rate will yield more tax revenues in the low elasticity society.
31Proposition 7 provides conditions under which this is the unique outcome. Roughly speaking,
these conditions require that the taxable capacity of the economy is large enough to easily meet
the needs of maintaining an adequate level of public goods.
However, the analysis also shows that the conventional wisdom needs qualiﬁcation. When
the economy’s taxable capacity is small relative to its public good needs, legislative decisions will
actually be eﬃcient in the long run. Legislators will not choose to redistribute to their districts
when maintaining public good levels requires a level of taxation that creates signiﬁcant distortions
in the economy. Moreover, the direction of the distortions emerging from legislative choice could
be the opposite from that suggested by the conventional wisdom. Speciﬁcally, legislators can hold
back on public good spending in the belief that accumulating too large a stock of these goods
will lead future legislators to start engaging in pork barrel spending. This behavior yields an
equilibrium with no distributive policy-making and an overall size of government that is below
optimal.
The model also yields some interesting positive implications. First, it suggests that when the
need for public goods is acute, then the legislature will approve its budgets by unanimity, but as the
need for public investment is saturated, the political equilibrium will shift to a regime of minimal
winning coalitions. Thus, the size of the legislative coalitions passing budgets may decline over
time as a country builds up its stock of public goods. Second, the model suggests that societies
in which citizens have a more elastic labor supply will enjoy better quality governments. A
higher elasticity of labor supply, reduces distributive policies but not the long run levels of public
goods. Finally, the model suggests that the quality of government as measured by the proportion
of revenues devoted to distributive policies is inversely correlated with the productivity of the
private sector.
There are many ways in which the model might usefully be developed.24 Perhaps the most
important task is to incorporate government borrowing. To maintain tractability, one could sim-
plify the model by assuming that the public good was not durable but allow the legislature to
ﬁnance spending by a combination of taxation and issuing public debt. Debt would then form the
dynamic linkage across periods. In this context, it would be natural to assume that the per period
value of public goods was stochastic (reﬂecting, for example, wars or terrorist threats) and study
24 It might also be interesting to incorporate into the framework the alternative “demand bargaining” approach
to legislative policy-making suggested by Morelli (1999).
32how debt, spending and taxation responded to shocks. This would facilitate a political economy
investigation of the normative theory of debt and taxation suggested by Barro (1979).
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357A p p e n d i x
Proof of Proposition 1: To prove the result, we will need some additional notation. For any
strictly concave function v(x) consider the problem for all µ ∈ [0,∞)
max{r,x} µ[u(w(1 − r),g)+δv(x)] + B(r,x;g)
s.t. B(r,x;g) ≥ 0
(10)
Interpreting v(x) as the expected payoﬀ with x units of the public good, the problem is to maximize
the aggregate utility of µ legislators under the assumption that any revenue that is not used for
investment in the public good is used to ﬁnance pork in these legislators’ districts. Under the
assumption that v is strictly concave, there is a unique solution to this problem given by r(g;µ,v)
and x(g;µ,v).
Note the following facts about this problem. First, for µ suﬃciently small, the solution will
involve a positive budget surplus (i.e., B(r,x;g) > 0). Second, for µ suﬃciently large, the optimal
tax rate will be such that all tax revenues are used to ﬁnance investment in the public good and
hence B(r,x;g) = 0. Third, if it is the case that for some e µ it is optimal to select a tax rate-public
good pair such that all revenues are used for investment (i.e., B(r,x;g) = 0), then this must also
be optimal for all µ>e µ.
Now deﬁne µ(g;v) to be the size of the smallest group of legislators who would choose to devote
all revenues to investment. Formally,
µ(g;v)=m i n {µ ∈ [0,∞):B(r(g;µ,v),x(g;µ,v);g)=0 }.
Then all groups of legislators of size less than µ(g;v) would devote some revenues to pork and all
larger groups would devote all revenues to investment. It should be noted that µ(g;v)e x i s t sa n d
is unique for all g.W e n o w h a v e :
Lemma A.1: Let {rτ(g), sτ(g), xτ(g)}T
τ=1 be an equilibrium with associated payoﬀ function
v1(g).( i )I fµ(g;v1) ≤ q,t h e n
(rτ(g),s τ(g),x τ(g)) = (r(g;n,v1),0,x(g;n,v1)) for all τ =1 ,...,T.
(ii) If µ(g;v1) >q ,t h e n







n for all τ =1 ,...,T − 1
vT+1(g) − u(w(1 − r(g;q,v1)),g) − δv1(x(g;q,v1)) for τ = T
.
P r o o fo fL e m m aA . 1 :We begin by considering the problem of the proposer in the ﬁnal round




[u(w(1 − r),g)+B(r,x;g) − (q − 1)s + δv1(x)]
subject to
u(w(1 − r),g)+s + δv1(x) ≥ vT+1(g),







+ δv1(x):B(r,x;g) ≥ 0}.
We now establish:
Claim A.1: Let (rT,s T,x T) solve the round T proposer’s problem. Then (rT,x T)s o l v e sp r o b l e m
(10) with µ = q and
sT = vT+1(g) − δv1(xT) − u(w(1 − rT),g).
P r o o fo fC l a i mA . 1 :It is easy to see that
sT = vT+1(g) − δv1(xT) − u(w(1 − rT),g).
F o ri ft h i sw e r en o tt h ec a s ei tw o u l df o l l o wf r o mt h ed e ﬁnition of vT+1(g)t h a te i t h e rt h ei n c e n t i v e
constraint is violated or sT > 0 and we could create a preferred proposal by just reducing sT.I t
follows that we can write the proposer’s payoﬀ as
q [u(w(1 − rT),g T)+δv1(xT)] + B(rT,x T;g).
Now suppose that (rT,x T) does not solve problem (10) with µ = q.L e t( r0,x 0) solve problem
(10) with µ = q and
s0 = vT+1(g) − δv1(x0) − u(w(1 − r0),g).
Then, the proposer’s payoﬀ under the proposal (r0,s 0,x 0)i s
q [u(w(1 − r0),g0)+δv1(x0)] + B(r0,x 0;g0).
37By construction, the incentive constraint is satisﬁed and, by deﬁnition of vT+1(g), s0 ≥ 0. Note
also that
B(r0,x 0;g0) − (q − 1)s0 =( q − 1)[u(w(1 − r0),g0)+δv1(x0)] + B(r0,x 0;g0) − (q − 1)vT+1(g)
= q[u(w(1 − r0),g0)+δv1(x0)] + B(r0,x 0;g0)
−[u(w(1 − r0),g0)+δv1(x0)+( q − 1)vT+1(g)]
≥ q[u(w(1 − r0),g0)+δv1(x0)] + B(r0,x 0;g0) − qvT+1(g),
where the last inequality follows by deﬁnition of vT+1(g). The diﬀerence on the right hand side
must be non-negative. To see this, note that
vT+1(g)=u(w(1 − r∗),g)+δv1(x∗)+B(r∗,x ∗;g)/n
for some (r∗,x ∗) such that B(r∗,x ∗;g) ≥ 0 and hence
q[u(w(1 − r0);g0)+δv1(x0)] + B(r0,x 0;g0) ≥ q[u(w(1 − r∗);g)+δv1(x∗)] + B(r∗,x ∗;g)
≥ qvT+1(g).
Thus, (r0,s 0,x 0) is feasible for the proposer’s problem and yields a higher payoﬀ than (rT,s T,x T)
- a contradiction. This completes the proof of Claim A.1. ¥
It follows from Claim A.1 that if µ(g;v1) ≤ q,t h e n( rT(g), sT(g), xT(g)) equals (r(g;n,v1),0,x(g;n,v1)),
while if µ(g;v1) >q ,t h e n( rT(g), sT(g), xT(g)) equals
(r(g;q,v1),v T+1(g) − u(w(1 − r(g;q,v1)),g) − δv1(x(g;q,v1)),x(g;q,v1)).
Now consider the round T − 1 proposer’s problem
max
(r,s,x)
[u(w(1 − r),g)+B(r,x;g) − (q − 1)s + δv1(x)]
subject to
u(w(1 − r),g)+s + δv1(x) ≥ vT(g),
B(r,x;g) ≥ (q − 1)s, and s ≥ 0.
If µ(g;v1) ≤ q then we know that
vT(g)=u(w(1 − r(g;n,v1)),g)+δv1(x(g;n,v1)) = vT+1(g)
38so applying the exact same logic as above implies that the solution to the round T −1 proposer’s
problem is (r(g;n,v1), 0, x(g;n,v1)). Repeated application of the same logic implies that the
solution to the proposer’s problem is (r(g;n,v1), 0, x(g;n,v1)) in all earlier proposal rounds.
On the other hand, if µ(g;v1) >qthen we know that










Let (rT−1,s T−1,x T−1) denote the solution. It is straightforward to show the desired result if
sT−1 > 0, so we need only rule out the possibility that sT−1 =0 .I fsT−1 =0 ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s e
that B(rT−1,x T−1;g) > 0a n dt h a t( rT−1,x T−1) solves the problem
maxu(w(1 − r),g)+δv1(x)+B(r,x;g)
s.t. u(w(1 − r),g)+δv1(x) ≥ vT(g)
.
Now consider the proposal




The payoﬀ to the proposer under the policy (r0,s 0,x 0)i s
q[u(w(1 − r0),g)+δv1(x0)] + B(r0,x 0;g) − (q − 1)vT(g) (11)
But we know that u(w(1 − rT−1),g)+δv1(xT−1) ≥ vT(g), and hence a lower bound of (11) is:
q[u(w(1 − r0),g)+δv1(x0)] + B(r0,x 0;g) − (q − 1)[u(w(1 − rT−1),g)+δv1(xT−1)].
The payoﬀ to the proposer under the optimal policy (rT−1,0,x T−1)i sg i v e nb y :
u(w(1 − rT−1),g)+δv1(xT−1)+B(rT−1,x T−1;g).
I tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
u(w(1 − rT−1),g)+δv1(xT−1)+B(rT−1,x T−1;g)
>q [u(w(1 − r0),g)+δv1(x0)] + B(r0,x 0;g) − (q − 1)[u(w(1 − rT−1),g)+δv1(xT−1)]
39which implies that
q[u(w(1 − rT−1),g)+δv1(xT−1)] + B(rT−1,x T−1;g)
>q [u(w(1 − r0),g)+δv1(x0)] + B(r0,x 0;g).
This contradicts the fact that (r0,x 0)=( r(g;q,v1),x(g;q,v1)).





in all earlier proposal rounds. This completes the proof of Lemma A.1. ¥
Lemma A.1 tells us what equilibrium proposals must look like. The next step is to develop
expressions for (r(g;n,v1),x(g;n,v1)) and (r(g;q,v1),x(g;q,v1)). If µ(g;v1) ≤ q,t h e ni tm u s tb e
t h ec a s et h a tB(r(g;n,v1),x(g;n,v1);g) = 0. It follows that we can write
(r(g;n,v1),x(g;n,v1)) = (r(x∗(g;v1),g),x ∗(g;v1)),
where r(x,g) is the tax rate function from the analysis of the planner’s problem, and
x∗(g;v1) = argmax
x {u(w(1 − r(x,g)),g)+δv1(x)}.




q[u(w(1 − r),g)+δv1(x)] + B(r,x;g). (12)
Notice that the solutions to this problem are independent of g and, moreover, the tax rate is
independent of the value function. Thus, we may write the solutions as (r∗,x ∗(v1)).
To complete the proof of the Proposition, it only remains to show that there exists a unique
g∗(v1) > 0s u c ht h a tµ(g;v1) ≤ q for all g ≤ g∗(v1)a n dµ(g;v1) >qfor all g>g ∗(v1). We begin
with the following useful observation.
Claim A.2: For any strictly concave function v(x), g ≥ 0a n dµ ∈ [0,∞), let (b r(g;µ,v), b x(g;µ,v))
b et h es o l u t i o no ft h ep r o b l e m
max
{r,x}
µ[u(w(1 − r),g)+δv(x)] + B(r,x;g) (13)
and deﬁne b µ(g;v)a s
40b µ(g;v)=m i n {µ ∈ (0,∞):B(b r(g;µ,v), b x(g;µ,v);g)=0 }.
Then, it is the case that b µ(g;v)=µ(g;v).
P r o o fo fC l a i mA . 2 :Assume ﬁrst that b µ(g;v) <µ (g;v), then for any µ ∈ (b µ(g;v),µ(g;v)) the
unconstrained solution (b r(g;µ,v),b x(g;µ,v)) would violate the budget constraint:
B(b r(g;µ,v),b x(g;µ,v);g) < 0
(note that B(b r(g;µ,v), b x(g;µ,v);g) is strictly in decreasing in µ since b r(g;µ,v) is strictly decreasing
and b x(g;µ,v) is non decreasing in µ). This implies that the constrained solution (r(g;µ,v),x(g;µ,v))
to problem (10) satisﬁes the budget constraint with equality: i.e.,
B(r(g;µ,v),x(g;µ,v);g)=0 .
This implies that µ(g;v) ≤ µ, a contradiction.
Assume now that b µ(g;v) >µ (g;v), then for any µ ∈ (µ(g;v), b µ(g;v)), since µ<b µ(g;v), it
must be B(b r(g;µ,v), b x(g;µ,v);g) > 0. In this case the solution of the unconstrained problem
is the same as the constrained solution r(g;µ,v),x(g;µ,v) (since the constraint is not binding):
so B(r(g;µ,v),x(g;µ,v);g) > 0. However, since µ>µ (g;v) at the the solution of the con-
strained problem, the constraint must be satisﬁed as equality, B(r(g;µ,v),x(g;µ,v);g)=0 ,a
contradiction. This completes the proof of Claim A.2. ¥
We can now show that µ(·;v1) is an increasing and continuous function. For monotonicity, let
g0 >g , µ0 = µ(g0;v1)a n dµ = µ(g;v1). We need to show that µ0 >µ . Suppose, to the contrary,
that µ0 ≤ µ. By Claim A.2, we know that (r(g;µ,v1),x(g;µ,v1)) solves the problem
max
(r,x)
µ[u(w(1 − r),g)+δv1(x)] + B(r,x;g),
while (r(g0;µ0,v 1),x(g0;µ0,v 1)) solves the problem
max
(r,x)
µ0[u(w(1 − r),g0)+δv1(x)] + B(r,x;g0).
It can easily veriﬁed that r(g0;µ0,v 1) ≥ r(g;µ,v1)a n dx(g0;µ0,v 1) ≤ x(g;µ,v1). Thus, since g0 >g
B (r(g0;µ0,v 1),x(g0;µ0,v 1);g0) >B(r(g;µ,v1),x(g;µ,v1);g)=0
41which contradicts the deﬁnition of µ0.
For continuity, let g ≥ 0 and consider a sequence gn → g.L e t t i n g µn = µ(gn;v1), we need
to show that µn → µ(g;v1). Note ﬁr s tt h a tf o ra n yg there is an upperbound M such that
µ(gn;v1) ∈ [0,M] (at least for n large enough): so we can assume, without loss of generality, that
the limit µ∞ = limn→∞ µn exists. Since B(r,x;g)i sc o n t i n u o u si na l li t sa r g u m e n t sa n ds i n c e
r(g;µ,v1)a n dx(g;µ,v1) are continuous in g and µ by the Theorem of the Maximum,w eh a v e
that
lim
n→∞B (r(gn;µn;v1),x(gn;µn;v1),v 1);gn)=B (r(g;µ∞,v 1),x(g;µ∞,v 1);g).
Moreover, since B (r(gn;µn;v1),v 1),x(gn;µn;v1),v 1);gn) = 0 for all gn we have that
B (r(g;µ∞,v 1),x(g;µ∞,v 1);g)=0 .
Clearly, it can not be that µ∞ <µ (g;v1), because this would violate the deﬁnition of µ(g;v1).
Assume then that µ∞ >µ (g;v1) .I nt h i sc a s e ,w em u s th a v et h a tx(g;µ∞,v 1) ≥ x(g;µ(g;v1),v 1)
and r(g;µ∞,v 1) <r (g;µ(g;v1),v 1), but this would imply
B (r(g;µ∞,v 1),x(g;µ∞,v 1),v 1);g) <B(r(g;µ(g;v1),v 1),x(g;µ(g;v1),v 1);g)=0
which is a contradiction.
The ﬁnal step is to show that µ(0;v1) <qwhile for g large enough µ(g;v1) >q . The latter is
obvious, and the former is implied by Assumption 1. To see this, suppose to the contrary, that
µ(0;v1) ≥ q. Then it would follow that µ(g;v1) >qfor all g>0. This would imply that for all
g>0























But then, since µ(0;v1) ≥ q i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t












which violates Assumption 1 (since r∗ =( 1− q/n)/(1 + ε − q/n)).
It now follows that there exists a unique g∗(v1) > 0s u c ht h a tµ(g∗(v1);v1)=q.B e c a u s e
µ(·;v1) is increasing, this g∗(v1) will have the property that for all g ≤ g∗(v1), µ(g;v1) ≤ q and
for all g>g ∗(v1), µ(g;v1) >q . Thus, the proof of the Proposition is complete. QED
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof will proceed in two parts. First, we develop necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium of each of the three types. Then we analyze
when these conditions will be satisﬁed, relating them to A and A.
Existence of a Type I equilibrium

























This inequality is therefore a necessary condition for the existence of a Type I equilibrium.
In such an equilibrium, if g>g ∗ then the legislature will choose the public good level x∗ and
tax rate r∗ that period and every period thereafter. It must therefore be the case that the value









1−δ(u(w(1 − r∗),x ∗)+
B(r∗,x∗;x∗)
n ) g>g ∗
.
(15)
The question is whether there exists a strictly concave value function that satisﬁes this re-
lationship when inequality (14) is satisﬁed. If so, there will exist an associated equilibrium
{(rτ(g),s τ(g),x τ(g))}T
τ=1 in which if g ∈ [0,g∗]
(rτ(g),s τ(g),x τ(g)) = (r(x∗(g;v1),g),0,x ∗(g;v1)) for all τ =1 ,...,T,
43and if g ∈ (g∗,∞)







n for all τ =1 ,...,T − 1
vT+1(g) − u(w(1 − r∗),g) − δv1(x∗)f o rτ = T
The proof of the following Lemma establishes not only that there does exist such a function but
also that it is unique.
Lemma A.2: There exists a Type I equilibrium if and only if inequality (14) is satisﬁed. Moreover,
there is a unique such equilibrium.
P r o o fo fL e m m aA . 2 :Let g>x ∗ be an arbitrarily large but bounded scalar. We will ﬁrst
restrict the range of public good levels to [0,g] and prove the existence of a unique v1(g)t h a t
satisﬁes (15) when this assumption is satisﬁed. Then we will extend the solution for g>g.D e ﬁne











This function v(g) is continuous, bounded and strictly concave on [g∗,g]. Then let F denote the
set of continuous, bounded, weakly concave functions v : <+ → < such that v(g)=v(g) for all
g ∈ [g∗,g]. This set is non empty, closed, bounded, and convex. Finally, deﬁne the functional Ψ





maxx {u(w(1 − r(x,g)),g)+δv(x)} g ∈ [0,g∗]
u(w(1 − r∗),g)+
B(r∗,x∗;g)
n + δv(x∗) g ∈ (g∗,g]
. (16)
For a given expected continuation value function v at time t+1,Ψ(v) provides the expected value
function of a legislator at time t in an equilibrium with x∗(v1) >g ∗(v1).
We will now prove that there exists a unique v1 ∈ F such that v1 = Ψ(v1). The ﬁrst step is to
show that Ψ maps F into itself; i.e., that Ψ(v) ∈ F. It is immediate that Ψ(v)(g)=v(g) for all
g ∈ [g∗,g], and that Ψ(v) is bounded on [0,g]. However, we need to prove that Ψ(v) is continuous
and (strictly) concave.
Continuity. The function Ψ(v) is continuous on [0,g∗)b yt h eTheorem of the Maximum,a n d
on (g∗,g]b yd e ﬁnition. We just need to show that it is continuous at g = g∗.S i n c eB(r∗,x ∗;g∗)=
440, we have that
lim




= u(w(1 − r∗),g∗)+δv(x∗).
Next note that (r∗,x ∗)=( r(x∗(g∗;v),g∗),x ∗(g∗;v)). To see this, suppose the converse. Then,
since B(r∗,x ∗;g∗) = 0, it must be that:
u(w(1 − r(x∗(g∗;v),g∗)),g∗)+δv(x∗(g∗;v)) >u (w(1 − r∗),g∗)+δv(x∗),
which implies that
q [u(w(1 − r(x∗(g∗;v),g∗)),g∗)+δv(x∗(g∗;v))] + B(r(x∗(g∗;v),g∗),x ∗(g∗;v);g∗)
>q [u(w(1 − r∗),g∗)+δv(x∗)] + B(r∗,x ∗;g∗).
But this is a contradiction since (r∗,x ∗) solves the problem
max
(r,x)
q[u(w(1 − r),g)+δv(x)] + B(r,x;g).
T os e et h el a t t e r ,n o t et h a tg i v e nt h a tx∗ >g ∗, we know that v(x∗)=v(x∗)a n d ,b yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,
δqv0(x∗)=p. It follows, therefore, that
lim
g%g∗ Ψ(v)(g)=u(w(1 − r(x∗(g∗;v),g∗)),g∗)+δv(x∗(g∗;v))
= u(w(1 − r∗),g∗)+δv(x∗)= l i m
g&g∗ Ψ(v)(g).
Strict Concavity. We proceed in three steps.
Step 1. Ψ(v) is strictly concave on [0,g∗]. In this case the budget constraint is binding and














Take two points g1 and g2 with 0 ≤ g1 <g 2 ≤ g∗,a n das c a l a rφ ∈ [0,1]. Deﬁne ri and xi to be the
optimal policies with public good level gi i =1 ,2. Let gφ = φg1+(1− φ)g2, rφ = φr1+(1− φ)r2,
and xφ = φx1+(1− φ)x2.S i n c ev(x) is concave, the function u(w(1−r),g)+B(r,x;g)/n+δv(x)
45is concave in (r,x,g) .T h u s ,w eh a v et h a t












Since B(r,x;g)i sc o n c a v ei n( r,x,g), we have that B(rφ,x φ;gφ) ≥ 0, so that
u(w(1 − rφ),g φ)+
B(rφ,x φ;gφ)
n













Therefore φΨ(v)(g1)+( 1− φ)Ψ(v)(g2) < Ψ(v)(gφ) as required.
Step 2. Ψ(v) is strictly concave on (g∗,g]. This is immediate from the deﬁnition of Ψ(v)(g).
Step 3. Ψ(v) is strictly concave on [0,g]. Let g1 and g2 be such that 0 ≤ g1 ≤ g∗ <g 2 ≤ g.
We have two possible cases. First it may be that gφ ≤ g∗. For all g ∈ [0,g], let (r0(g;v),x 0(g;v))
be the solution to the problem










We have that Ξ(v)(g) ≥ Ψ(v)(g) for all g ∈ [0,g]. Indeed, the two functionals are equivalent for
g ∈ [0,g∗] but, if g>g ∗, Ψ(v)(g)i sl e s st h a nΞ(v)(g). Therefore we have:
φΨ(v)(g1)+( 1− φ)Ψ(v)(g2) ≤ φΞ(v)(g1)+( 1− φ)Ξ(v)(g2)












φ = φr0(g1;v)+(1−φ)r0(g2;v)a n dx0

























> φΨ(v)(g1)+( 1− φ)Ψ(v)(g2).
The second case arises when gφ >g ∗.L e tψ ∈ [0,1] be such that g∗ = ψg1 +(1− ψ)g2;b yt h e
p r e v i o u ss t e p ,w eh a v et h a tΨ(v)(g∗) > ψΨ(v)(g1)+(1−ψ)Ψ(v)(g2) (since obviously g∗ ∈ [0,g∗]).
Take now a scalar η ∈ [0,1] such that ηg∗ +( 1− η)g2 = gφ.S i n c eΨ(v) is strictly concave and
continuous in g ≥ g∗,i tm u s tb et h a tΨ(v)(gφ) > ηΨ(v)(g∗)+(1−η)Ψ(v)(g2). Therefore we have:
Ψ(v)(gφ) > ηΨ(v)(g∗)+( 1− η)Ψ(v)(g2) > ηψΨ(v)(g1)+( 1− ηψ)Ψ(v)(g2)
= φΨ(v)(g1)+( 1− φ)Ψ(v)(g2)
where the second inequality follows from Ψ(v)(g∗) > ψΨ(v)(g1)+( 1− ψ)Ψ(v)(g2), and the last
equality follows from the deﬁnitions of η and ψ: φg1 +( 1− φ)g2 = gφ = ηg∗ +( 1− η)g2 =
ηψg1 +( 1− ηψ)g2, implying φ = ηψ.
Given that Ψ(v) ∈ F, to prove existence and uniqueness of a ﬁxpoint of Ψ in F,i ti ss u ﬃcient
to prove that Ψ(·) is a contraction in F.L e t ω1,ω2 ∈ F be such that ω1 (g) ≤ ω2 (g) for all
g ∈ [0,g]. Deﬁne xωi(g) as a solution of maxx {u(w(1 − r(x,g)),g)+δωi(x)} ∀i =1 ,2. For
g ∈ [0,g∗], we have:
Ψ(ω2)(g)=m a x
x {u(w(1 − r(x,g)),g)+δω2(x)} ≥ u(w(1 − r(xω1(g),g)),g)+δω2(xω1(g))
≥ u(w(1 − r(xω1(g),g)),g)+δω1(xω1(g))
= Ψ(ω1)(g)
and, by deﬁnition, Ψ(ω2)(g)=Ψ(ω1)(g)f o rg ∈ (g∗,g]. So Ψ(·)s a t i s ﬁes Blackwell’s monotonicity
condition (cf. Blackwell (1965)). Let a be a weakly positive scalar, then for any g ∈ [0,g∗]a n d
v ∈ F we have:
Ψ(v + a)(g)=m a x
x {u(w(1 − r(x,g)),g)+δv(x)} + δa = Ψ(v)(g)+δa
and Ψ(v+a)(g)=Ψ(v)(g)i fg ∈ (g∗,g]. Since δ ∈ (0,1), we conclude that Blackwell’s discounting
condition is satisﬁed as well (cf. Blackwell (1965)). It follows that Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions
47are satisﬁed and, by Theorem 5 in Blackwell (1965), Ψ(·) is a contraction with modulus δ.F r o m
all these properties, it follows that there exists a unique continuous, bounded, strictly concave
value function v1 that satisﬁes (15).
To see that the equilibrium value function can be extended for g>g,n o t et h a tw ec a nd e ﬁne
v(g)=v(g)f o rg>g. The resulting value function is continuous, concave and continues to be a
ﬁxpoint of (16). This completes the proof of Lemma A.2. ¥
Existence of a Type II equilibrium
In this case, Proposition 3 tells us that the equilibrium converges monotonically to the planner’s
steady state. Thus, it must be the case that for all g ≤ g∗(v1), v1(g)=V (g)/n where V (g)i st h e













It turns out that x∗∗ <g ∗∗ if and only if the marginal cost of public funds at the planner’s steady
s t a t ee x c e e d st h er a t i on/q;t h a ti s ,
(
1 − r(xo,x o)





To see this, note from the Euler equation for the planner’s problem, that at the planner’s steady
state
δV 0(xo)=p(
1 − r(xo,x o)
1 − r(xo,x o)(1 + ε)
).
Thus, if the condition is satisﬁed then it must be the case that V 0(xo) >V 0(x∗∗)w h i c hb yt h e
concavity of the planner’s value function implies that x∗∗ >x o. But since the condition implies








From Figure 3(b) it is clear that this implies that xo(g∗∗)=x∗∗ <g ∗∗.
For g>g ∗∗, we know that the legislature selects the public good level x∗∗ which puts proposals






n g ≤ g∗∗




48It is now straightforward to show that this is indeed an equilibrium value function and is strictly
concave. The associated equilibrium policy proposals {(rτ(g),s τ(g),x τ(g))}T
τ=1 are such that if
g ∈ [0,g∗∗]
(rτ(g),s τ(g),x τ(g)) = (r(x∗(g;v1),g),0,x ∗(g;v1)) for all τ =1 ,...,T,
and if g ∈ (g∗∗,∞)







n for all τ =1 ,...,T − 1
vT+1(g) − u(w(1 − r∗),g) − δv1(x∗∗)f o rτ = T
.
Thus we have:
Lemma A.3: There exists a Type II equilibrium if and only if inequality (18) is satisﬁed. More-
over, there is a unique such equilibrium.
Existence of a Type III equilibrium












≤ δ[Aαe xα−1 +(
1 − r∗





In such an equilibrium, if g>e x then the legislature will choose the public good level e x and tax
rate r∗ that period and every period thereafter. It must therefore be the case that the value









1−δu(w(1 − r∗), e x) g>e x
. (20)
The question is whether there exists a strictly concave value function which satisﬁes this rela-
tionship when inequalities (19) are satisﬁed. If so, there will exist an associated equilibrium
{(rτ(g),s τ(g),x τ(g))}T
τ=1 in which if g ∈ [0, e x]
(rτ(g),s τ(g),x τ(g)) = (r(x∗(g;v1),g),0,x ∗(g;v1)) for all τ =1 ,...,T,
49and if g ∈ (e x,∞)







n for all τ =1 ,...,T − 1
vT+1(g) − u(w(1 − r∗),g) − δv1(e x)f o rτ = T
The following Lemma shows that the answer is yes.
Lemma A.4: There exists a Type III equilibrium if and only if inequality (19) is satisﬁed. More-
over, there is a unique such equilibrium.
P r o o fo fL e m m aA . 4 :The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma A.2. Let g>e x be an
arbitrarily large but bounded scalar. We will ﬁrst restrict the range of public good levels to [0,g]
and prove the existence of a unique v1(g)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes (20) when this assumption is satisﬁed, then
we will extend the solution for g>g.D e ﬁne for g ∈ [e x,g] the function






u(w(1 − r∗), e x).
Then let e F denote the set of continuous, bounded, weakly concave functions v : <+ → < such





maxx {u(w(1 − r(x,g)),g)+δv(x)} g ∈ [0, e x]
u(w(1 − r∗),g)+ 1
nB(r∗, e x;g)+δe v(e x) g ∈ (e x,g]
.
It can be shown that e Ψ(v) ∈ e F and, further, that e Ψ(v) is strictly concave. It can also be
shown that e Ψ(v) is a contraction mapping which implies that there exists a unique function v1
such that v1 = e Ψ(v1). This function is strictly concave and satisﬁes (20). As in the case with
x∗(v1) >g ∗(v1), the value function can be extended in (g,∞)b yd e ﬁning v(g)=e v(g)f o rg>g.
The resulting value function is continuous, concave and continues to be a ﬁxpoint of (20). This
completes the proof of Lemma A.4. ¥
When are the conditions satisﬁed?
Deﬁne A to be the value of A that would be such as to make the discounted marginal beneﬁt
of the public good in the minimum winning coalition range equal to p/q at the public good level











50Similarly, let A be the value of A that would be such as to make the discounted marginal beneﬁt














Notice that A must be less than A since, holding constant public good preferences, the value of
an additional unit is higher in the unanimity range.
Now we have the following convenient result.
Lemma A.5: (i) Condition (14) is satisﬁed if and only if A ∈ (0,A). (ii) Condition (18) is
satisﬁed if and only if A>A . (iii) Condition (19) is satisﬁed if and only if A ∈ [A,A].









Then, we know that condition (14) is satisﬁed if and only if x∗(A) <
R(r∗)
pd or equivalently if only




























which implies that b A = A.
(ii) Condition (18) is that
(
1 − r(xo,x o)





Let xo(A) denote the planner’s steady state public good level with public good preference pa-
rameter A and ro(A)=r(xo(A),x o(A)) the associated tax rate. Clearly, xo(A)a n dro(A)a r e
increasing in A.L e t t i n ge A be such that
(
1 − ro(A)





it is clear that condition (18) is satisﬁed if and only if A> e A. But note that ro( e A)=r∗ and that
δn e Aαxo( e A)α−1 = p[1 − δ(1 − d)]
∙
1 − r∗
1 − r∗(1 + ε)
¸
51or, equivalently,
δ[Aαxo( e A)α−1 +(
1 − r∗












and hence that e A = A as required.
( i i i )T h i si si m m e d i a t e .
This completes the proof of Lemma A.5. ¥
The proposition now follows by combining Lemmas A.2 - A.5. QED









The planner’s steady state is given by:
δ[nAα(xo)α−1 +(
1 − ro
1 − ro(1 + ε)
)p(1 − d)] =
1 − ro
































































52This implies that r∗ >r o - the equilibrium tax rate is higher than the planner’s tax rate. On the
















which implies that r∗ <r o.
















Thus, it is clear that the level of public goods is below that at the planner’s solution, because the
marginal cost is higher and the marginal beneﬁti sl o w e r .QED
Proof of Lemma 2: It suﬃces to show that r∗ <r o. But we know from the proof of Lemma
1 that this follows if A ∈ (A,A]. But we also know that when this type of equilibrium exists it
m u s tb et h ec a s et h a tA ∈ [A,A]. QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :Solving (8) and (9) for A and A yields
A =













Moreover, we have that
R(r∗)=nr∗(1 − r∗)εwε+1εε =
(n − q)ε2εwε+1
(1 + ε − q/n)ε+1.
From these expressions it is clear that A and A are decreasing in δ and q and increasing in p
and w. For the claims about the impact of increasing the elasticity of labor supply ε,d e ﬁne the
function w(ε) from the equality
nwε+1εε = K,
for some constant K.T h e nl e te R(ε) be the function that equals R(r∗) when the elasticity is ε and
the wage is w(ε); that is,
e R(ε)=
(n − q)ε2εw(ε)ε+1
(1 + ε − q/n)ε+1 =
(1 − q/n)εε
(1 + ε − q/n)ε+1.
53We need to show that e R(ε)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nε. Taking logs, we have that
lnR(ε)=l n ( 1 − q/n)εε − ln(1 + ε − q/n)ε+1








which implies the result. QED
54